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Abstract
The security of the previous quantum key distribution protocols,which is guaranteed
by the nature of physics law, is based on the legitimate users. However, the impersonation
of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper, in practice, will be existed in a large probability. In this
paper an improvement scheme for the security quantum key is proposed.
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Quantum cryptography [1] is a recently developed technique that permits two parties,
who share no secret information initially, to communicate over an open channel and to
establish between themselves a shared secret sequence of bits. Quantum cryptography is
provably secure against eavesdropping attack, in that, as a matter of fundamental prin-
ciple, the secret data can not be compromised unknowingly to the legitimate users of the
channel. Three ingenious protocols [2-4] in quantum cryptography have been proposed.
The first, by Bennett et al, relies on the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics to
provide key security. The security guarantee is derived from the fact that each bit of
data is encoded at random on either one of a conjugate pair of observables of quantum-
mechanical object. Because such a pair of observables is subjected to the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle [5], measuring one of the observables necessarily randomizes the
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other. A further elegant technique has been proposed by Ekert, which relies on the vio-
lation of the Bell inequalities [6] to provide the secret security. And the third technique,
devised by Bennett, is based on the transmission of nonorthogonal quantum states.
Raw quantum cryptography is useless in practice because limited eavesdropping may
be undetectable, yet it may leak some information, and errors are to be expected even in
the absence of eavesdropping. Also, we must protect against an eavesdropper who would
impersonate Alice for Bob and Bob for Alice. For these reasons, quantum cryptography
must be supplemented by classical tools such as privacy amplification [7], error correction
[8]. To obtain more high security quantum privacy key, in general, four processes has be
included in the quantum key distribution:
a). Quantum transmission
b). Data sifting
c). Error-correction
d). Privacy amplification
Obviously, the tools from steps b) to d) are classic supplement. For demonstration we use
the quantum cryptographic protocols known as BB84 or four-state protocols. In general,
the BB84, Ekert92, and B92 protocols possess the same process, the different is only in
the method of quantum transmission, the process is described in figure 1.
In the first step of establishing the key, Alice sends a random sequence of signal built
up from the four possibly signal state, each appearing with equal probability. Bob pos-
sesses two measurements apparatuses adapted to the two sets of signal states. He may
distinguish either between vertical and horizontal linear polarize photons or between right
and left circular polarize photons. For each of the signals sent to him by Alice he chooses
with equal probability an apparatuses to use. After Bob’s receiving and measurement,
he sends publicly the measurement base to Alice, and Alice compares the base between
Alice and Bob’s base.
After Alice and Bob obtain what is call the raw data by the quantum transmission, the
raw data must be sifted because it consists of those bits which Bob either did not receive
at all or did not correctly measure in the basis used to transmit them. By comparison
publicly the basis between Alice and Bob, the data sifting procedure is completed.
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The Third step is the data correction. A distinct feature of error correction in quantum
cryptography is that the error correction process is public, while the transmission itself is
secret. In other words, Alice and Bob must conduct a public discussion to identify, with a
high degree of confidence, all errors in their data, while at the same time leaking as little
information as possible about the data. The basic idea is that Alice and Bob compute and
exchange a series of block check sums of their data and proceed by bi-section to locate
the error in each of the problem blocks. After their block check sums agree several times
in a row, Alice and Bob conclude that all transmission errors have been removed. Each
disclosed check sum is presumed to have been recorded by eavesdropper Eve, and to be
worth one bit of Renyi information to Eve. The number of iterations required, and hence
the amount of Renyi information leaked, depends on the desired confidence level, the
initial error rate, and the manner in which Alice and Bob select their check sum blocks.
By the distillation art of secret key, the so called privacy amplification, a final secure
quantum key is generated and distributed. The basic principle of privacy amplification
is as follows. Let Alice and Bob shared a random variable W , such as a random n-bit
string, while an eavesdropper Eve learns a corrected random variable V , providing at most
t < n bits of information about W , i.e., H(W |V ) ≤ n − t. Eve is allowed to specify an
arbitrary distribution PVW (unknown to Alice and Bob) subject to the only constraint that
R(W |V = v) ≤ n − t with high probability (over values v), where R(W |V = v) denotes
the second-order conditional Renyi entropy of W , given V = v. For any s < n− t, Alice
and Bob can distill r = n − t − s bits of the secret key K = G(W ) while keeping Eve’s
information about K exponentially small in s , by publicly choosing the compression
function G at random from a suitable class of maps into {0, 1}n−t−s.
Obviously, the above procedure is based on the legitimate users, refereed to as Alice and
Bob. However, the practice existence of impersonation of Alice or Bob by eavesdropper,
make us have to take some action to against the eavesdropper, an efficient way is to
verify the communicators’ identity. In the follows, we improve the previous quantum key
distribution scheme to guarantee the security of quantum key for truly legitimate users .
After the privacy amplification, a compressed key is obtained, but it can not be acted
as the final key because of the impersonation. So the fifth step for identity verification
3
following the previous schemes, which is described in figure 1, must be added for the
security quantum key. The improving scheme is shown in figure 2. Of course, the identity
verification step can also be inserted in the front of the privacy amplification according to
the sequence: quantum transmission 7−→ data sifting 7−→ error correcti on 7−→ identity
verification 7−→ privacy amplification, the schematic diagram is described in figure 3. It
is more practicable according to the latter sequence, because if one of the communicators
is impersonation, the procedure may be over before the step of privacy amplification.
The key problem of the identity verification is to obtain the authentication key, it can
be established by the technique that divides the initial quantum secret key K (it may be
called Raw Key) into two parts, i.e.,K = Ka⊕Km, where the sign ⊕ represents the logic
plus, the key Ka is used for identity verification, while the key Km is as a final shared
secret key between Alice and Bob. The Ka may be obtained by two techniques. A single
method is to choose the bits from K according to a proper ‘rule’, which is adapted publicly
by users Alice and Bob, for example, one may take the bits in odd position in K. The
guaranteed security of the quantum key K keeps the taken bits a high degree of security,
although the ‘rule’ is chosen publicly. Then Alice and Bob constructs independently the
authentication key Ka. At last Alice and Bob correct the Ka like that techniques used
in the second step (Data Sifting) of quantum key distribution. More complexity, one can
adopt the privacy amplification technique again or the hash function to obtain a shorter
key as Ka from the “Raw key” K. In this way, the Ka is more secure and the quantum
key will be not influenced.
As shown in figure 2, after obtaining the shared dynamical-key Ka, Alice and Bob use
it to verify themselves identity, the technique may be like that base on the symmetric
cryptosystem. If the processes of identity verification give the ‘yes’, the Km may act as
the final key, otherwise the communication is over or re-set up.
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Figures captions
• Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the quantum key distribution system.
• Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the quantum key distribution system with identity
verification. The identity verification step is in front of privacy amplification step a)
and acts as the last step b).
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